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 I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
 The wider context of competition policy and enforcement 
EU competition policy aims at achieving three main objectives: i) protecting competition on 
the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare, ii) supporting growth, jobs and the 
competitiveness of the EU economy and iii) fostering a competition culture. 
Those objectives are an important part of the wider general objectives of the Europe 2020 
Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The Strategy sets out concrete targets to 
be achieved within the next decade in areas such as employment, education, energy use and 
innovation, in order to overcome the impact of the financial crisis and put Europe back on 
track for economic growth. Enforcement actions and advocacy efforts by the Commission and 
the Member States have to be considered together for the overall achievement of those 
objectives. 
A weaker competition framework would have a negative impact on growth. Strong 
competition policy and enforcement through all instruments – the control of State aid, 
antitrust and merger control – are essential to rebuilding the economy. In times of economic 
hardship, there may be calls to relax the competition rules to accommodate short-term 
concerns encountered by businesses. Such relaxation would have prevented healthy recovery. 
So it is essential that competition rules be fully maintained, even in the current economic 
context. 
Competition stimulates entrepreneurship, improves efficiency and creates the best conditions 
for innovation. In other words, everyone is better off when markets are competitive - 
consumers, taxpayers, citizens and businesses. To increase awareness, the Commission has 
undertaken various communication initiatives explaining the benefits of competition policy to 
European citizens1. 
STATE AID 
1. Developments in State aid in times of crisis 
Prevailing uncertainties in financial markets required prolongation of the extraordinary State 
aid crisis rules 2011. On 1 December, the Commission decided to prolong the special rules 
applicable to financial institutions in the context of the crisis2. The prolongation included 
some modifications on the remuneration requirements for guarantees and recapitalisation. The 
rules will apply as long as required by market conditions. 
Through those rules, State aid control continued to ensure a consistent policy response to the 
financial crisis throughout the EU, and contributed significantly to limiting distortions of 
competition between beneficiary financial institutions within the Single Market. A detailed 
assessment of State aid control during the financial crisis can be found in the Commission 
Staff Working Paper "The effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the 
                                                 
1 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html  
2 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis, OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7-10. 
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financial and economic crisis"3, published by the Commission as a response to the 
Parliament's request. 
The Commission confirmed its approach to failing banks in a number of important decisions 
throughout the year. Institutions which have no realistic prospect of returning to viability must 
exit the market and not be kept artificially afloat by repeated state support. The troubled Irish 
lender Anglo Irish Bank is a good example. The Commission approved the plan submitted by 
the Irish authorities, which foresees a joint wind-down of Anglo Irish Bank together with Irish 
Nationwide Building Society over a period of ten years. Another prominent example is the 
case of long-time ailing German Landesbank WestLB, which will ultimately be split up. 
Remaining assets and liabilities will be transferred to a bad bank in order to be wound down. 
By 30 June 2012 WestLB is to stop its banking activities and henceforth only provide asset 
management services. Only the small part of WestLB’s most conservative business activities - 
the services it provides to small local savings banks - will stay in the market, but taken over 
by Helaba. 
On the other hand, some banks relied heavily on State aid but parts of their activities have a 
realistic prospect to return to viability. Those institutions can be allowed to stay on the market 
provided that they considerably reduce their size and substantially change their business 
model to focus only on these viable activities. That approach is well illustrated by the 
approval of the restructuring of the German bank Hypo Real Estate, which is to reduce to 15% 
of its pre-crisis balance sheet and phase out a number of business fields. Similarly, the 
Commission approached restructuring aid to another German bank HSH Nordbank in the light 
of a commitment to reduce its balance sheet size by 61% compared to pre-crisis levels by 
exiting certain business lines. Such deep restructuring tackling the root of past failure and 
avoiding aid being used to undercut competitors ensure that distortions of competition created 
by massive State support is minimised. The Commission also applied this approach in the 
context of smaller banks. For instance Eik bank4 in Denmark was split into a bad bank put in 
liquidation, while the good part of the bank was subject to a sale via a bidding process. A 
similar line was taken for the Austrian bank Kommunalkredit5 which had to be nationalised in 
a rescue operation. The bank's business was split into non-strategic activities (to be wound 
down) and strategic activities (corresponding to approximately 40% of the balance sheet) 
which will be re-privatized. 
In the case of ABN Amro Bank6, the need for State aid stemmed primarily from the specific 
separation context: separation of the Dutch bank activities from the ailing Fortis group and 
from the previously existing ABN Amro Group. The two businesses were left with 
insufficient capital to face the crisis and finance their merger. The Commission took into 
account that the bank did not need aid primarily because of mismanagement or excessive risk 
taking at its level and therefore only requested behavioural safeguards (i.e. it did not seek any 
divestment of businesses). 
                                                 
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/temporary_stateaid_rules_en.html  
4 Case SA.31945 Aid for the liquidation of Eik Banki P/F and Eik Bank Denmark A/S, decision of 6 June 2011, 
OJ C 274 17.9.2011, p. 3-6; IP/11/677. 
5 Case SA.32745, Restructuring of Kommunalkredit Austria AG, decision of 23 June 2011, OJ C 239, 17.8.2011, 
p. 1-3; IP/11/389. 
6 Case SA.26674 Restructuring aid to ABN AMRO, decision of 5 April 2011, OJ L 133, 20.5.2011, p.1-46; 
IP/11/406. 
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In October, the ECOFIN Council concluded that the EU State Aid Framework should 
continue as the sole EU level co-ordination tool and that – in the short-/medium-term – no 
further frameworks are required. 
The Competition DG started work developing new guidelines for the rescue and restructuring 
of financial institutions in a post-crisis regime, as well as on the new rescue and restructuring 
rules for the real economy. Work on those rules will continue in 2012. 
2. SGEI – a main policy project 
Beyond the actions taken in the context of the financial and economic turmoil, the revision of 
the State aid rules for services of general economic interest (SGEI) constituted the main 
policy project in the area of State aid. 
After extensive public consultations and valuable contributions received from Member States, 
European institutions and stakeholders, the Commission adopted on 20 December a revised 
package of EU State aid rules for the assessment of public compensation SGEI. The new 
package clarifies key State aid principles and introduces a diversified and proportionate 
approach with simpler rules for SGEIs that are small, local in scope or pursue a social 
objective, while better taking account of competition considerations for large cases. 
The new SGEI package7 provides Member States with a simpler, clearer and more flexible 
framework for supporting the delivery of high-quality public services to citizens. Member 
States are largely free to define which services are of general interest, but the Commission 
must ensure that public funding granted to provide such services does not unduly distort 
competition in the internal market. 
All social services are now exempt from the obligation of notification to the Commission, regardless of the 
amount of the compensation received. The services must meet "social needs as regards health and long term 
care, childcare, access to and reintegration in the labour market, social housing and the care and social 
inclusion of vulnerable groups". Previously only hospitals and social housing were exempted. Other SGEIs are 
exempted provided the compensation is less than €15 million a year. 
 
On the other hand, there will be a greater scrutiny of other SGEIs involving compensation of more than €15 
million a year and where the potential for distortions of competition within the single market is higher. In its 
assessment the Commission will also check whether public procurement rules have been complied with, thereby 
ensuring more convergence between the two sets of rules. 
The new rules, which replace the so-called "Monti-Kroes" Package of July 2005, clarify basic 
notions such as "economic activity" to help national and also regional or local governments 
apply the rules. The new package consists of four instruments: (i) a Communication clarifying 
basic concepts of State aid relevant to SGEI; (ii) a revised Decision, exempting Member 
States from the obligation to notify public service compensation for certain SGEI-categories 
to the Commission; (iii) a revised Framework for assessing large compensation amounts 
                                                 
7 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 4-14. 
Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (notified under document 
C(2011) 9380), OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3-10. 
Communication from the Commission – European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service 
compensation (2011), OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 15-22.  
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/sgei.html  
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granted to operators outside the social services field and (iv) a proposal for a de minimis 
Regulation, providing that compensation below a certain threshold (EUR 500,000 over three 
years) does not fall under State aid scrutiny, thus cutting red tape for small SGEIs. The 
proposal is scheduled for adoption in the spring 2012. 
In its reform of the State aid rules for SGEI, the Commission involved the European 
Parliament at an early stage. Vice-President Almunia and his services participated in meetings 
of the Public Services Intergroup on SGEI in the months preceding the launch of the public 
consultation. Following the adoption of the Communication, the Vice-President presented the 
Commission's initial thinking to the Economic Affairs (ECON) Committee of the European 
Parliament on 22 March, and reported back to the committee in July and again in November, 
when he stated that he would be able to take into account a number of the concerns raised by 
Parliament in its Resolution on the SIMON report8. 
The final adopted version of the SGEI Package takes into account comments received in the 
consultation process, including from the Parliament. For example, the initial proposal was 
amended so as to cut red tape for compensation for social services, thus making it easier to 
provide those services in particular for the elderly and for people with disabilities, as also 
requested by the Parliament. The Communication was also modified to provide further 
clarification on the so-called fourth Altmark criterion9 (either the beneficiary is chosen in a 
public tender or compensation does not exceed the costs of a well-run undertaking that is 
adequately equipped with the means to provide the public service). In addition, the proposal 
for a de minimis regulation for SGEI was amended substantially to provide further 
simplification: the condition on the number of inhabitants represented by the public authority 
granting the aid was removed and a three-year threshold was set. 
3. State aid contributing to Europe 2020 objectives 
The Commission's Europe 2020 strategy aims at enhancing economic growth, sustainability 
and competitiveness in the European Union. State aid control has an important role to play in 
that process. 
In line with the objective of supporting sustainable growth and achieving the 20/20/20 
climate/energy target, the Commission services have started to prepare guidelines for the 
treatment of State aid connected to the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and have launched a 
public consultation on the draft Commission Communication (State aid Guidelines). That 
draft Communication defines the compatibility criteria of four new State aid measures with 
the internal market (i.e. aid to compensate increases in electricity prices resulting from the 
inclusion of the costs of greenhouse gas emissions due to EU ETS; investment aid to highly 
efficient power plants; optional transitional free allocation in the electricity sector in some 
Member States; and the exclusion of certain small installations from the EU ETS, subject to 
certain conditions). 
The ETS was introduced to reduce CO2 emissions and moderate climate change. Directive 
2003/87/EC established a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Union (the EU ETS), which was improved and extended as from 1 January 2013 by Directive 
                                                 
8 Texts adopted: P7_TA(2011)0494 Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0371&language=EN  
9 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH, Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark 
GmbH, judgment of 24 July 2003, [2003] ECR I-7747.  
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2009/29/EC (the ETS Directive). The ETS Directive is part of a legislative package 
containing measures to fight climate change and promote renewable and low-carbon energy. 
That package was mainly designed to achieve the Union’s overall environmental target of a 
20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990 and a 20% share of renewable 
energy in the Union’s total energy consumption by 2020. The new rules are expected to be 
adopted by the Commission in the course of 2012. 
The Europe 2020 Strategy also underlined the importance of broadband deployment to create 
a true single digital market and foster cohesion and competitiveness in the EU and set 
ambitious targets for broadband development. One of its flagship initiatives, the Digital 
Agenda for Europe (DAE)10, aims to deliver sustainable economic and social benefits from a 
digital single market based on broadband networks and sets out ambitious coverage targets11. 
Investments in that sector will come primarily from commercial operators; however, public 
intervention is essential to achieve the DAE objectives in areas where the business case for 
broadband is weak. 
The Commission's approach to State aid in this sector is represented by the Broadband 
Guidelines12, which are due for review by September 2012. In 2011 the Commission started 
the revision by launching a fact-finding exercise, including a public consultation of Member 
States and other stakeholders in the sector and drafting an expert report to highlight the main 
technological, market and regulatory developments.  
Sustainability and competitiveness of the European economy can be further enhanced by 
innovative financial instruments, as they enable Member States to deliver policy objectives 
with less and better targeted State aid. State aid control focuses on enhanced financial 
leverage, investment risk mitigation and the involvement of professional intermediaries. 
Potential risks include, in particular, the risk of crowding out other potential sources of 
funding and transferring all the financial risks to the public investor, rather than mitigating 
them. Such developments would create inefficient market structures and potential market 
distortions, which need to be addressed by competition policy. 
Innovative financial instruments refer to public interventions other than grant funding. They cover a broad range 
of repayable instruments, such as loans, equity and guarantees. There has been an increasing use of financial 
instruments by Member States and the Commission, which reflects a policy shift from a traditional grant 
approach to repayable investments, with an emphasis on financial sustainability and leverage funding, as well as 
the involvement of professional investment intermediaries. That trend is expected to continue in the current 
environment of budgetary constraints. 
 
In 2011, Member States continued to develop a variety of innovative financial instruments, often financed from 
Structural Funds. There are two notable examples: (i) JEREMIE, which focuses on improving access to finance 
for SMEs, and (ii) JESSICA, which promotes sustainable urban development13. The Commission, building on its 
recent experience, has placed innovative financial instruments at the heart of the Europe 2020 Strategy. To 
ensure a coherent approach and sound financial management, the Commission has proposed common rules and 
                                                 
10 A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245 final/2, 26.8.2010. 
11 (i) To bring basic broadband to all Europeans by 2013 and (ii) ensure that by 2020 all Europeans have access 
to much higher internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and 50% or more of European households should subscribe to 
internet connections above 100 Mbps. 
12 Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ C 
235, 30.9.2009, p. 7. 
13 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/instruments/index_en.cfm   
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guidance for innovative financial instruments which make use of equity or debt, the so-called equity and debt 
platforms14 implemented in cooperation with the EIB (European Investment Bank). 
In that context, the Commission continued its competition advocacy efforts vis-à-vis Member 
States and other external stakeholders by shaping the design of financial instruments in order 
to ensure their alignment with State aid policy. Moreover, recognising the limitations of 
existing State aid instruments, the Commission has developed a coherent compatibility 
approach to innovative financial instruments through its decision-making practice. In 2011 the 
Commission also took two important decisions on JESSICA funds established in the United 
Kingdom and Spain, approved directly under Art 107(3)(c) TFEU15. 
Under that new approach, the decisions approving the funding set out detailed compatibility 
principles. To avoid crowding out and ensure an incentive effect, financial instruments must 
aim at addressing market failures and/or enhancing socio-economic cohesion in pursuit of 
objectives of common interest. To avoid over-compensation and limit potential distortions of 
competition, any form of asymmetric risk sharing between public and private investor must 
not exceed what is necessary to generate a fair rate of return on investment in favour of the 
latter. That approach avoids the need to assess separately each individual project under a 
JESSICA measure, possibly under different guidelines, and hence considerably reduces red 
tape. 
The decisions provide detailed guidance to Member States on operating conditions and 
governance principles for investment intermediaries operating under the JESSICA 
framework. Moreover, the experience in the context of JESSICA provides important input for 
future State aid policy developments in the field of financial instruments, including the next 
generation of innovative financial instruments under the new financial framework 2014-2020.  
4. The Commission's monitoring and recovery efforts in relation to 
State aid 
To ensure the effective enforcement of the State aid rules as regards approved aid, the 
Commission has, since 2006, launched regular ex post monitoring exercises for non-notified 
aid measures granted under the GBER16 or under approved schemes. 
The 2010-2011 exercise included the ex post monitoring of 30 approved aid schemes or 
measures exempted of notification in 18 Member States.  It targeted measures where the 
biggest budgets are spent overall (regional aid, environmental aid and R&D&I aid), but also 
sectoral schemes, aid in the form of risk capital, and aid in the broadband area. The results 
showed that generally the part of the existing State aid architecture allowing the approval of 
aid schemes and enabling Member States to implement aid measures under the General Block 
Exemption Regulation (GBER) and Block Exemption Regulations (BERs) functions 
reasonably well. In fact, out of the 30 cases in the 2011 sample, 20 did not raise specific 
concerns. However, compared to previous years' samples, substantive problems or procedural 
issues (such as transparency, reporting, speed and quality of answers) were identified in a 
                                                 
14 The Communication of 19 October 2011 on "A new framework for the next generation of innovative financial 
instruments – the EU equity and debt platforms" (COM(2011)622 final).  
15 Case SA.32835 Northwest Urban Investment Fund (JESSICA), decision of 13 July 2011, OJ C 281 24.9.2011, 
p. 6-8; IP/11/876 and Case SA.32147 Andalucía Jessica Holding Fund, decision of 19 October 2011, OJ C 79, 
17.3.2012, p. 1.  
16 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible 
with the common market in application of Article 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General Block Exemption 
Regulation), OJ L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3. 
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growing minority of cases. That indicator may point to issues of administrative capacity or 
lack of knowledge of the State aid rules at Member State level. The cases in which no 
appropriate solution was identified are still being investigated. 
The volume of aid granted through approved or block-exempted schemes has increased over 
time, and now represents more than 80% of the total volume of aid17. To ensure effective 
enforcement of the State aid rules, the Commission decided that the 2011-2012 exercise, 
launched in October, would include a significantly larger number of cases (i.e. 52 in total) 
covering all Member States. They would cover 33% of the aid amount granted in the EU, 
through approved aid schemes or block exempted measures. 
Fostering a competition culture at national level includes the Commission's powers to ask the 
granting Member State to recover unlawful aid which has been declared incompatible. In 
2011, further progress was made to ensure that those recovery decisions are enforced 
effectively and immediately. By 31 December 2011, the amount of illegal and incompatible 
aid recovered had increased from EUR 2.3 billion in December 2004 to EUR 12.3 billion 
(resulting in a decrease from 75% to around 13.6% of the percentage of illegal and 
incompatible aid still to be recovered as of 31 December 2011). 
Recovery decisions adopted in 2011 6 
Amount recovered in 2011 (in € million) 230 
Pending active recovery cases on 
31.12.2011 43 
When a Member State does not comply with a recovery decision and has not been able to 
demonstrate the existence of absolute impossibility, the Commission has, over the past few 
years, strengthened its practice of launching infringement procedures18 in accordance with 
Article 108(2) TFEU19 or Article 260(2) TFEU20.  
Court rulings in 2011 for failure to implement a recovery decision 4 
Court rulings in 2011 for failure to implement a previous ruling 1 
Commission's launching of judicial actions for failure to recover in 2011 6 
Infringement procedures have indeed proved to be efficient in ensuring better enforcement of 
recovery decisions. This year, five cases were closed after judicial actions before the Court of 
Justice, while 29 out the 45 open cases are still subject to litigation. 
In addition, in the follow-up to the Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National 
Courts21, advocacy efforts have intensified. An information package was published on 
the Competition DG's website22 and a booklet23 to assist judges in their daily work was 
widely distributed. Specific training for national judges was also organised24. 
                                                 
17 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/2011_autumn_en.pdf  
18 Section 4, Notice from the Commission – Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions 
ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid, OJ C 272, 15.11.2007, p. 4. 
19 Actions under Article 108(2) are aimed at condemning a Member State for non-implementation of a State aid 
recovery decision. 
20 Actions under Article 260(2) are infringement actions aimed at condemning a Member State for non-
implementation of a Court judgment, and may include the payment of fines. 
21 Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by National courts, OJ 85, 9.4.2009, p. 1. 
22 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/state_aid.html  
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Finally, in 2011, some Member States notified a general framework for aid (also called ex 
ante scheme) in the interest of the efficiency of the procedure. Such schemes make good the 
damages in future occurrences of one or more specific types of natural disasters, without the 
need for separate notification of the aid granted for each occurrence. The Commission has 
accepted ex ante schemes for four categories of natural disasters25: earthquakes, avalanches, 
landslides and floods (four types of disasters which are also explicitly recognized as 
constituting natural disasters in the State aid guidelines for the agriculture sector26). That 
approach allows swifter implementation of the aid measures. It still gives the Commission 
sufficient information to check compliance with the scheme and, in case of non-compliance, 
to start an investigation of possible unlawful aid measures and order recovery of incompatible 
aid. 
ANTITRUST & CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 
1. A sound framework for enforcement of competition rules 
The year 2011 was an important year for issues of due process concerning the EU's 
institutional framework for the enforcement of competition law. Indeed, the past years 
witnessed a debate surrounding the set-up of the Commission's enforcement system in view of 
the right to a fair trial under the ECHR and the respect of due process principles. Rulings in 
2011 by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Menarini,27 and the Court of 
Justice in its Copper Industrial Tubes28 and Copper Plumbing Tubes judgments,29 confirmed 
that the institutional framework for the enforcement of competition law, by which and 
administrative organ as the Commission takes decisions which are subject to full judicial 
review, ensures an adequate protection of the fundamental rights of the persons concerned by 
those decisions. 
In Menarini, the ECtHR confirmed its case law in respect of the right to a fair trial30. The judgment concerned a 
case in which the Italian competition authority imposed a fine in relation to an antitrust infringement regarding 
medical equipment. The Italian competition authority (like the European Commission) has the power both to 
investigate and to find infringements by imposing fines, subject to two-tier judicial review. While every 
institutional set-up has its particularities, the system in Italy is similar to the EU system for the enforcement of 
competition law. The ECtHR ruled that the system respects the f guarantees flowing from the right to a fair trial 
laid down in Article 6 ECHR in particular because (i) decisions of the competition authority are subject to 
judicial review on questions of fact and law (ii) the courts can verify the proportionality of the sanction imposed 
and have the power to change that sanction.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/state_aid/national_courts_booklet_en.pdf  
24 Through the contact point, ec-amicus-state-aid@ec.europa.eu several requests for information and opinions by 
national judges have been dealt with. 
25 Cases SA.31151 (N 274b/2010) Germany Disaster Aid Scheme "Bayerischer Härtefonds Finanzhilfen" 
(beneficiaries in manufacturing and other sectors); Commission decision of 23 November 2011 on State aid case 
SA.33425 Framework Scheme Disaster Aid Saxony (manufacturing and other sectors) decision of 23 November 
2011, OJ C 2, 5.1.2012, p. 7-9. 
26 Commission Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 to 2013, OJ C 319, 
27.12.2006, p. 1-33. 
27 Judgment of the ECtHR of 27 September 2011, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, Application No 
43509/08, paras. 57-67.  
28 Case C-272/09 P KME Germany AG v Commission, judgment of 8 December 2011. 
29 Cases C-386/10 P Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission and C-389/10 P KME Germany AG and 
Others v Commission, judgments of 8 December 2011. 
30 Judgment of 21 May 2003, Janosevic v Sweden, Application No 34619/97, para. 81.  
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The Court of Justice has come to a similar conclusion in its Copper Industrial Tubes and Copper Plumbing 
Tubes judgments where it considered that the judicial review carried out by the General Court in respect of 
Commission decisions imposing fines in competition matters fulfils the guarantees flowing from the principle of 
effective judicial protection as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
2. Improving procedures, enhancing transparency, safeguarding 
efficiency 
The Commission has taken measures to reform and to increase transparency of its antitrust 
and merger procedures. These measures were based on an initiative launched in 2010, and 
followed extensive dialogue with stakeholders, of which the European Parliament was kept 
informed. With these measures the Commission has given a comprehensive response to the 
concerns and suggestions by stakeholders with regard to the conduct of antitrust and merger 
procedures. 
The package, adopted in October, consists of the following documents: 
• a Commission Notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of Proceedings under 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU31 and 
• a Staff Paper on Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence in 
antitrust and merger cases32. 
As part of this package, the President of the Commission also adopted new Terms of 
Reference for the Hearing Officers33. The new terms of reference include extended 
possibilities for the parties to call on the hearing officers in order to safeguard the effective 
exercise of their procedural rights, not only after a Statement of Objections is issued, but 
throughout the investigative phase as well.  
In order to further safeguard the efficiency of its antitrust investigations, the Commission is 
also pursuing a number of cases for violation of rules concerning the Commission's 
investigations. In that regard, on 24 May, a fine of EUR 8 million was imposed on Suez 
Environment for breach of a seal affixed by the Commission during an inspection in April 
201034. 
3. Private enforcement of EU competition law 
In 2011, the Commission continued its initiatives to ensure that those who have been harmed 
by infringements of the EU competition rules have effective remedies in order to obtain the 
compensation to which they are entitled under EU law. Following on from its 2008 White 
Paper on Damages Actions35, the main initiatives in this field in 2011 concerned the 
quantification of harm and collective civil redress. The Competition DG launched a public 
                                                 
31 Commission Notice on Best Practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 
OJ C 308, 20.10.2011, p.6-32. 
32 Best Practices for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in cases concerning the application 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in merger cases, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html 
33 Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on the function and terms of 
reference of the Hearing Officer in certain competition proceedings, OJ L275, 20.10.2011, p.69. 
34 Case COMP/39796 Suez Environnement breach of seal, decision on procedural fines of 27 August 2011; 
IP/11/632. 
35 White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules of 2.4.2008 (COM(2008)165 final), 
together with Commission Staff Working Paper (SEC(2008) 404). 
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consultation on a draft Guidance Paper on the quantification of harm in antitrust damages 
actions36, aiming at providing guidance to courts to overcome difficulties associated with 
quantifying harm in antitrust damages cases. A final version of the Guidance Paper will be 
published in 2012. 
Following a request by the European Parliament37, the Commission also launched a public 
consultation 'Towards a coherent European approach to collective redress'38. As a follow-up, 
the Commission intends to define general principles of collective redress at EU level, with a 
view to possibly proposing legislation. Such legislation would aim at ensuring that victims of 
EU antitrust law infringements have access in all Member States to truly effective 
mechanisms for obtaining full compensation for the harm they suffered, while taking into 
account confidentiality and the protection of leniency programs. 
Private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules before national courts is also an essential 
complement to strong public enforcement by the Commission and National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs). As regards the interaction of public and private enforcement, the 
question arises whether and under which conditions information voluntary submitted to a 
competition authority by undertakings in the framework of a leniency programme be 
disclosed to claimants in actions for damages that relate to a previous finding of a competition 
law infringement by a competition authority. 
In its judgment in Pfleiderer39, the Court of Justice held that it is for the national courts to 
determine, according to national law and on a case-by case basis, the conditions under which 
access to documents relating to a leniency programme must be permitted or refused by 
weighing the respective interests in favour of disclosure of the information and in favour of 
the protection of that information provided voluntarily by the applicant for leniency". Against 
this background, the Commission submitted observations as amicus curiae under Article 
15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 to the High Court of England and Wales in the National Grid 
case. 
4. Technology Transfer Agreements: forthcoming policy review in 
light of Europe 2020 objectives 
The Europe 2020 Agenda of the Commission has identified innovation policy as one of its 
major pillars requiring further development. Innovation, i.e. improved or new technologies or 
organisational innovation, results in productivity increases. It is acknowledged that 
competition is one of the main drivers of innovation and therefore of productivity as a source 
of growth. By improving – either incrementally or in breakthrough fashion – on existing 
technologies and methods of production, competition policy can make a significant 
contribution to innovation, efficiency and be a driver for growth.  
Licensing is an important part of the innovation process, as it facilitates dissemination of new 
products and technologies and allows companies to integrate and use complementary 
                                                 
36 The text of this document, together with the written responses received and material from a workshop with 
economists can be accessed at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html  
37 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the 
EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)). Texts adopted: P6_TA(2009)0187. 
38 Commission Staff Working Document Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress, 4 February 2011, SEC(2011)173 final; IP/11/132. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html 
39 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, judgment of 14 June 2011. 
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technologies. Licensing is therefore vital for economic development and consumer welfare. 
However, in some circumstances licensing agreements can also have a stifling effect on 
competition. This can be the case, for instance, when two competitors use a licensing 
agreement with the aim of dividing markets between them or when an important licensor 
excludes competing technologies from the market through conditions in its licensing 
agreements. How intellectual property right holders license their rights to other market 
participants is crucial for achieving the right balance between stimulating innovation and 
preserving a level playing field in the internal market. 
In this context the Commission announced, on 6 December, a review of the existing 
guidelines and the block exemption regulation for technology transfer agreements (TTBER)40. 
The purpose of the revision is to prepare the regime to be applied to technology transfer (i.e. 
patent, know-how and software licensing) after 30 April 2014. It should ensure that it both 
reflects current market realities and provides for the possibility of non-competitors and 
competitors to enter into technology transfer agreements where these contribute to economic 
welfare, without posing a risk to competition. Through a questionnaire, the Commission has 
invited stakeholders to present their views on their practical experience in applying the 
TTBER and the accompanying Guidelines. Feedback from stakeholders, received in early 
2012, is a key element of the review. 
5. An on-going firm stance against cartels 
Cartels are known for their harmful effects on consumers and the economy in general as they 
result in higher prices and less choice, as compared to a situation where companies compete 
fairly and on the merits. Therefore, the Commission continued its vigorous and relentless fight 
against cartels throughout 2011. It adopted four cartel decisions imposing fines totalling over 
EUR 614 million on 14 undertakings41 and concerning products of importance for consumers. 
It also launched a number of new investigations into different sectors, including financial 
services (derivatives) and car parts. 
Despite the unfavourable economic context, there was a decrease in the number of requests for fine reduction 
due to inability to pay (ITP). Under this concept, in exceptional cases, the Commission may, upon request, take 
account of an undertaking's inability to pay in a specific social and economic context. The purpose of this 
provision is to prevent the Commission's fines from driving financially distressed undertakings out of the market 
and causing adverse social and economic consequences. In 2011 the Commission granted a reduction of the fine 
for inability to pay to one undertaking in the refrigeration compressors case. 
Furthermore, the Commission’s efforts focused on improving the efficiency of the cartel 
proceedings through use of the settlement procedure. Once the investigation is at a 
sufficiently advanced stage, cartel cases are routinely screened as to their suitability for a 
settlement. In 2011, three out of the four cartel decisions adopted were settlement decisions. 
This brings to five the total number of settlement cases adopted since the procedure was 
introduced in 2008. In the three 2011 cases, settlement allowed the Commission to proceed 
more swiftly and efficiently compared to a normal cartel case. Settlements also bring benefits 
in terms of savings of both time and resources, but as experience has shown, a smooth 
                                                 
40 Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [now Article 101(3) TFEU], OJ 
L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 11-17 and Commission Notice Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty to technology transfer agreements., OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 2-42.  
41 Cases COMP/39579 Consumer Detergents, decision of 13 April 2011, OJ C 193, 2.7.2011, p 14-16, 
COMP/39482 Exotic Fruit, decision of 12 October 2011, COMP/39605 CRT Glass, decision of 19 October 
2011; IP/11/1214 and COMP/39600 Refrigeration compressors, decision of 7 December 2011. 
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settlement process also requires the trust and the cooperation of the parties and their legal 
advisors. In addition to the procedural benefits, settlements also contribute to increasing the 
deterrent effect of the Commission's enforcement actions in cartels, as it frees up resources 
more quickly for other cartel cases. Such efficiency-enhancing measures have been welcomed 
by many stakeholders, including the European Parliament. 
For example, the efficiencies produced by the settlement procedure in the Consumer 
Detergents case are particularly significant, as it took only 10 months from the first settlement 
meeting to the adoption of the Commission’s Decision in which it fined the three producers of 
washing powder a total of EUR 315.2 million for participating in a cartel aimed at stabilising 
market positions and coordinating prices in the period from 7 January 2002 until 8 March 
2005, in eight Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
the Netherlands). One supplier of washing powder received immunity from fines and two 
others reduction of fines under the Commission’s Leniency policy.  
Cartel Decisions 2011 € million Settlement 
Consumer Detergents 315,2 1 
Exotic fruit (Bananas Southern Europe) 9,9 0 
CRT Glass 128 1 
Refrigeration compressors 161 1 
Total 614,1 3 
Furthermore, in 2011 the European Courts have confirmed and clarified a number of 
important policy issues through an unusually high number of judgments in cartel cases42. The 
General Court has confirmed the legality and the main novel principles of the current 2006 
Fining Guidelines43 and has reiterated that the Commission must be able to adapt the level of 
fines to the needs of its enforcement policy, at any time. In another landmark case, the Court 
confirmed that the Commission is entitled to ensure that only genuine, sincere and continuous 
cooperation is rewarded under its leniency program44. The Court of Justice has also fully 
upheld the existence of a rebuttable presumption that anti-competitive conduct by a wholly-
owned or virtually wholly-owned subsidiary can be attributed to a parent company albeit that 
the Commission must provide sufficient reasoning, which will depend on the nature and 
content of the situation, to justify the rejection of rebuttal attempts by companies45.  
The Court also held that since there is no provision of EU law that would justify a refusal to 
grant access to leniency material to victims of competition law violations, it is for the national 
courts to weigh the interest of protecting leniency programmes against the interest of victims 
to obtain compensation for damages, in deciding whether to grant access or not46. While 
observant of this judgment, the Commission remains fully determined to protect its leniency 
                                                 
42 The European Court of Justice and the General Court during 2011 rendered more than 80 judgments 
concerning almost 20 different cartel decisions.  
43 Cases T-343/08 Arkema France v European Commission and T-299/08 Elf Aquitaine v European Commission, 
judgments of 17 May 2011, Case T-348/08 Aragonesas Industrias y Energia v European Commission, judgment 
of 25 October 2011 and Cases T-211/08 Putters International NV v European Commission, joined cases T-
208/08 Gosselin Group NV and T-209/08 Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje v European Commission, T-
204/08 Team Relocations NV and T-212/08 Amertranseuro International Holdings Ltd, Trans Euro Ltd et Team 
Relocations Ltd v European Commission, judgments of 16 June 2011. 
44 T-12/06 Deltafina v European Commission, judgment of 9 September 2011.  
45 Case C-404/11 P Elf Aquitaine v European  Commission, order of the Court of 2 February 2012,; Cases T-
185/06 Air Liquide v European Commission, judgment of 16 June 2011 and T-196/06 Edison v European 
Commission, judgment of 16 June 2011. 
46 Case C-360/09 P Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, judgment of 14 June 2011.  
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programme. This may include legislating on the interaction between private and public 
enforcement of the EU competition law, in order to clarify the status of information 
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Source: Directorate-General for Competition
8
 
6. Effective cooperation within the European Competition Network 
and with National Courts 
Both the Commission and the Member States contribute to ensuring well-functioning markets 
through the enforcement of European and national competition law. All 27 Member States 
have functioning competition agencies, with which the Commission has coordinated its 
actions in numerous cases. In 2011, no fewer than 88 cases were submitted by the Member 
States to the Commission for consultation, increasing the total number of cases brought since 
May 2004 to 555. 
Informal means of cooperation exist for policy development, both regarding industry sectors 
and common horizontal issues in competition enforcement. Topics are discussed in different 
fora within the European Competition Network (ECN), ranging from Director-General 
meetings to working groups and subgroups. Horizontal ECN working groups discuss policy 
aspects of competition enforcement, such as the operation of the ECN Model Leniency 
programme or common (technical) standards for optimising the investigative capacity of 
competition authorities. In addition, industry sector subgroups serve as active platforms of 
discussion for enforcement practices. Subgroups active in 2011 included sectors such as food, 
financial services and pharmaceuticals. 
In the framework of its support to national courts applying EU competition law, the 
Commission submitted three further amicus curiae observations on different matters to courts 
in Austria47, France48 and England and Wales49, bringing to nine the number of this type of 
                                                 
47 In its observations, the Commission argued that the effective enforcement of Article 101 TFEU would be 
hindered if a judgment would have as its subject matter solely national law and be entirely silent on the (non)-
applicability of EU law, as this could be deemed as an assurance for undertakings that a cartel does not infringe 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
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intervention since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003. Cooperation with national courts 
has been further supported by continued funding by the Commission of a specific training 
program for national judges, in the area of competition law50. 
7. The international dimension 
The globalisation of the economy calls for closer cooperation among competition authorities 
not only in Europe, but also across the globe. Such cooperation is essential to ensure 
consistency in the outcome of enforcement activities of different authorities, to enhance the 
effectiveness of their investigations, and to secure a level playing field for EU businesses in 
world markets. As in the past, and as encouraged by the European Parliament, the 
Commission has engaged in a policy dialogue with the authorities in other jurisdictions at 
both multilateral and bilateral level to promote convergence on both substantive and 
procedural competition rules. The Commission has also continued to cooperate closely with 
many competition agencies in concrete enforcement activities. 
In 2011, the Commission hosted the International Competition Network (ICN) Cartel 
Workshop, held in Bruges (BE) from 10 to13 October. Attendees from around 70 jurisdictions 
explored possibilities to coordinate investigations and evidence gathering and exchanged 
views on leniency policy and settlements, with a view to making the fight against cartels more 
effective and efficient. 
The EU has concluded agreements with the United States, Canada, Japan and Korea on cooperation between their 
respective competition agencies. These agreements include provisions on the notification of enforcement activities 
to the other side, coordination of investigations (for example coordinating the timing of dawn raids), positive and 
negative comity, and the establishment of a dialogue on policy issues. These agreements also specify that the 
competition agencies cannot exchange confidential information which is protected under their respective laws. The 
inability to exchange confidential information severely limits the scope of cooperation between the European 
Commission and foreign competition agencies. This limitation can undermine the effectiveness of the 
Commission's competition enforcement activities, especially in investigations of competition cases that have an 
international dimension, such as international cartels. This is why the Commission is trying to move beyond these 
"first generation" agreements and negotiate cooperation agreements which would also include provisions allowing 
the parties' competition agencies to exchange, under certain conditions, information which is protected under their 
respective rules on confidentiality. It is currently negotiating two such "second generation" agreements, one with 
Switzerland and one with Canada. If these negotiations were concluded successfully, these agreements would 
enhance further the efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement cooperation activities. 
To mark the 20th anniversary of its first cooperation agreement with the US, the Commission, 
the US Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice adopted revised Best 
Practices on cooperation in merger investigations to further optimise cooperation in merger 
investigations. 
A second priority for the Commission’s bilateral relations is to foster closer relations with 
competition authorities in the major emerging economies. Apart from its extensive technical 
cooperation programme with the Chinese competition authorities, the Commission signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with FAS, the competition authority of Russia. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                        
48 The Commission's observations relate to the interpretation of the Guidelines on the effect on trade concept and 
the way in which the appreciable effect on trade between Member States principle is applied when conduct 
affects trade only in part of a Member State. 
49 In its observations the Commission outlined its policy for securing both the integrity of leniency programs and 
the effectiveness of damages actions. 
50 In 2011, the Commission funded 24 training programs. 
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the Commission concluded negotiations on the competition chapter with Croatia, which is 
scheduled to join the EU in 2013. 
MERGER CONTROL 
1. Increased cooperation among Member States and internationally 
Merger control is essential in protecting consumer welfare by preventing market structures 
that could lead to unjustified price increases or reduction of choice, quality or innovation. EU 
merger control continues to be a key instrument for keeping (European) markets open and 
competitive, also in times of economic and financial crisis. 
Enforcement under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) has reached a high degree of maturity 
and procedural stability. The Commission and NCAs form the two pillars of EU merger 
enforcement. The difference from antitrust is that there is no single set of substantive rules 
being applied. While NCAs deal with national cases, mergers reaching the turnover thresholds 
of the EUMR are examined by the Commission, ensuring a "one-stop-shop" for such cases51. 
The creation of an EU Merger Working Group in 2010 was an important step forward towards 
more EU cooperation and further "soft" convergence. Drawing on agency practices and 
experience, the group explores possible solutions to common problems, focusing on what is 
feasible within the existing legal framework. In 2011, the group made a major contribution to 
this objective, adopting a set of Best Practices on Cooperation between EU National 
Competition Authorities in Merger Review. The Best Practices are intended to facilitate 
cooperation among NCAs regarding those mergers that do not benefit from the Commission's 
"one-stop shop review" and require clearance in several Member States. 
Cooperation also proved important with non-EU countries. Two merger cases52 involved 
intense cooperation with various competition authorities around the world. In both cases 
cooperation was particularly close with the authorities in the United States, while for one of 
them the Commission also, for the first time, worked together with China's merger control 
authorities. 
Going forward, the Commission will continue to promote international cooperation in merger 
control, which is becoming increasingly relevant in the context of globalised markets and 
mergers that are reviewed by several authorities. Ultimately, international cooperation should 
help to reduce the burden for merging companies by harmonising the review of international 
mergers, while maintaining effective merger control in the participating countries. 
2. Rebound of merger notifications and increase in complexity of the 
cases 
In 2011, mergers and acquisitions were on the rise again and with it the Commission's activity 
of reviewing mergers under the EUMR. 309 cases were notified to the Commission in 2011, 
                                                 
51 A comprehensive review of this aspect was carried out by the Commission in 2009. See Communication from 
the Commission to the Council, Report from the Commission to the Council on the operation of Regulation No 
139/2004, 18 June 2009, COM(2009)281 final. 
52 Cases COMP/M.6203 Western Digital Ireland, Ltd/Viviti Technologies, decision of 23 November 2011; 
IP/11/1395 and COMP/M.5984 INTEL / MCAFEE, decision of 26 January 2011, OJ C 98, 30.3.2011, p. 1; 
IP/11/70. 
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representing an increase of 13% as compared to 2010, slightly above the 10 year average of 
305 mergers per year. 
An important feature is that - in practice - notified mergers appeared to be more complex, as 
in 2011 the Commission opened in-depth investigations in eight cases in several sectors such 
as air transport, food, consumer goods, basic industries, IT, financial services and 
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 II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of policy developments and enforcement actions in a 
number of selected sectors where the Commission's work in the field of competition has been 
relevant throughout 2011. The actions undertaken in the energy and environment, ICT and 
media, rail transport and pharmaceutical industry sectors are presented here. 
An overview of the Commission's actions in relation to competition in three sectors where it 
has been particularly active in 2011, namely the financial services, airline and food sectors is 
set out in the Commission Communication to which this Staff Working Document is annexed. 
1. Energy & Environment 
The European Energy policy is built around three pillars: sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. 
Reducing green house gas emissions is vital to combating climate change. European consumers depend heavily 
on the secure and reliable provision of energy at competitive prices. Interconnections between European gas and 
electricity grids need to be substantially improved. The "Energy 2020 - A strategy for competitive, sustainable 
and secure energy" Commission Communication calls for action in areas where new challenges are emerging. 
These areas are energy efficiency, infrastructure, choice and security for consumers, energy technology and the 
external dimension of the internal energy market. Competition enforcement and advocacy, along with sector-
                                                 
53 Case COMP/M.5830 Olympic/Aegean Airlines, decision of 26 January 2011; IP/11/68. 
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specific legislative proposals, constitute the main tools the Commission has at is disposal in order to achieve 
these goals and creating a single European energy market by the 2020 target date. Given the strategic importance 
of the energy sector, the European Parliament,  in its Resolution on the 2010 report on competition policy (the 
Schwab report)54 requested that the Commission actively monitors the degree of competition on the market.  
 
Competition policy in the energy field aims to ensure a secure flow of energy, in particular electricity and gas, at 
competitive prices to EU households and businesses. An open and competitive single EU market will also 
guarantee secure provision of energy in the future by sending the necessary signals for investment and making 
the European market attractive to external suppliers. Such a market should also be open to new energy mixes and 
play a major role in developing and deploying new environmentally friendly technologies. Prices that reflect 
costs will help encourage energy efficiency, whilst supporting sustainability and security of supply. 
2011 has seen world events affecting the energy and environment sector such as the 
Fukushima nuclear incident in Japan. Coupled with the long-term trend of rising fuel prices 
and the high cost of renewable energy, these have added to the challenges faced by Member 
States to meet the Europe 2020 Strategy and EU energy policy objectives. Strengthening and 
building partnerships with key partners to the EU is also in strategic interest for secure, safe, 
sustainable and competitive energy. International cooperation with industrialised and fast 
growing economies is necessary to maintain Europe's position in energy research and 
innovation. 
 Competitiveness 
Competition enforcement and advocacy contribute to competitiveness by opening markets, 
preventing incumbents from reinforcing their dominant positions, and creating a framework 
for investment that avoids distortions and ensures the efficient allocation of public resources. 
With the aim of opening up national markets and preventing incumbents from abusing their 
dominant position in several Member States, 2011 saw the implementation of remedies in 
several of the antitrust cases that arose from the 2007 Energy sector inquiry. The competition 
concerns that were remedied in 2011 include foreclosure (ENI55, E.On gas56, GDF57 and 
RWE58 gas), customer tying through long-term contracts for large electricity customers (EDF 
in France59), and restrictions on export capacity (SVK60 in Sweden). The Commission also 
market tested measures proposed by Greece to remedy the advantage enjoyed by the State-
owned electricity company Public Power Corporation by reason of its access to lignite, which 
is the cheapest source of electricity generation in Greece61. 
Consolidation appeared to be the major feature in energy and environment-related industry. 
The Commission received an increasing number of notifications for mergers in the sector, out 
of which six62 related to the manufacture of equipment to produce electricity (from small 
                                                 
54 Texts adopted: P7_TA(2012)0031 available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2011-0424&language=EN  
55 Case COMP/39315 ENI, decision of 29 September 2010, OJ C 352, 23.12.2010, p. 8-10; IP/10/1197. 
56 Case COMP/39317 E.ON gas foreclosure, decision of 4 May 2010, OJ C 278, 15.10.2010, p. 9-10; IP/10/494. 
57 Case COMP/39316 GDF foreclosure, decision of 3 December 2009, OJ C 57, 9.3.2010, p. 13-14; IP/09/1872. 
58 Case COMP/39402 RWE gas foreclosure, decision of 18 March 2009, OJ C 133, 12.6.2009, p. 10-11; 
IP/09/410. 
59 Case COMP/39386 Long term electricity contracts in France, decision of 17 March 2010, OJ C 133, 
22.5.2010, p. 5-6; IP/10/290. 
60 Case COMP/39351 Swedish Interconnectors, decision of 14 April 2010, OJ C 142, 1.6.2010, p. 28-29. 
61 Case COMP/38700 Greek lignite and electricity markets; IP/11/34, 14.1.2011. 
62 Cases COMP/M.6039 GE/Dresser, decision of 4 January 2011, OJ C 29, 29.1.2011, p. 7; IP/11/5, 
COMP/M.6106 Caterpillar/MWM, decision of 19 October 2011; IP/11/1212 , COMP/M.6172 Daimler/Rolls 
Royce/Tognum/Bergen, decision of 25 July 2011, OJ C 275, 20.9.2011, p. 2; IP/11/924, COMP/M.6222 GE 
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mobile generating sets63 to the construction of complete combined cycle power plants64 or 
major components of such plants65). 
In its role of preserving the internal market and controlling whether Member States use their 
public resources in a non-distortive manner, the Commission opened a formal investigation in 
the field of environmental taxation66 and approved reduction of the UK Climate Change Levy 
(an energy tax, for aluminium and steel recycling processes) as being compatible with the 
2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines67. 
 Sustainability 
Sustainable development is the long term use of resources which aims to meet human needs 
for energy, while preserving the environment. Sustainability was at the heart of the measures 
reviewed under State aid control rules, authorising aid that supports renewable energy sources 
and environmentally friendly businesses. State aid can indeed correct market failures caused 
by negative external factors where environmental costs for society cannot yet be reflected in 
the production costs borne by companies. 
According to the latest available figures68, only 18% of electricity was generated by 
renewable energy sources in the EU, with different values across Member States, varying 
from approximately 5% in Latvia to 68% in Austria. Within that context, special attention was 
given to State measures in support of energy from renewable sources under the horizontal 
Environmental Aid Guidelines69 (such as in Finland70, Romania71 and France72) while at the 
same time several Member States aimed at promoting environmentally friendly cars and green 
products (Denmark73, United Kingdom74, France and Germany75). Reflecting the growing 
demand for meeting energy requirements from sustainable sources, the Commission 
                                                                                                                                                        
Energy/Converteam, decision of 25 July 2011, OJ C 255, 31.8.2011, p. 2; IP/11/922, COMP/M.6350 
Siemens/NEM Holding, decision of 28 October 2011, OJ C 23, 28.01.2012, p. 10; IP/11/1300 and  
COMP/M.6356 GE/IR/UEC/JV, decision of 27 October 2011, OJ C 321, 4.11.2011, p. 1. 
63 COMP/M.6039 GE/Dresser, decision of 4 January 2011, OJ C 29, 29.1.2011, p. 7; IP/11/5. 
64 COMP/M.6356 GE/IR/UEC/JV, decision of 27 October 2011, OJ C 321, 4.11.2011, p. 1. 
65 COMP/M.6350 Siemens/NEM Holding, decision of 28 October 2011, OJ C 23, 28.01.2012, p. 10; IP/11/1300. 
66 Case SA.18859 — 11/C (ex NN 65/10) Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04), OJ C 
245, 24.8.2011, p. 10 with corrigendum published in OJ C 328, 11.11.2011, p. 11. 
67 Case SA.31349 (N1/2011) Climate Change Levy reduction for metal recycling activities, decision of 23 
November 2011. 
68 Market Observatory for Energy, June 2011. 
69 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, p.1-33. 
70 Cases SA.31204 Operating aid for small wood fired CHP-plants and forest chips fired power plants, decision 
of 22 March 2011, OJ C153, 24.05.2011, p.1, SA.31107 Operating aid for wind power and bio gas electricity, 
decision of 15 March 2011, OJ C 180, 21.6.2011, p. 1-4, SA.32470 Forest chips, wind power, hydro power 
and bio gas electricity, decision of 22 March 2011, OJ C 180, 21.06.2011, p. 1and SA.32470 Fixed operating 
aid for power plants using renewable energy sources, decision of 22 March 2011, OJ C 189, 29.06.2011, p.1. 
71 Case SA 33134 Romania's green certificates scheme, OJ C 244, 23.08.2011, p. 2. 
72 Case SA 30113 Geothermal heat boiler for the industrial site of Beinheim. 
73 Case SA.31527 (N 386/2010) Pilot schemes for the purchase of electric vehicles, decision of 8 March 2011,OJ 
C 149, 20.05.2011, p. 3; IP/11/266. 
74 Case SA.30741 Aid to purchase of  ultra low-emission vehicles, decision of 19 October 2011. 
75 Cases SA.32206 Prolongation du régime temporaire de prêts bonifiés pour les entreprises fabriquant des 
produits verts, decision of 12 October 2011, OJ C 330, 12.11.2011, p. 1 and SA.32029 Extension for 2011 of the 
French and German aid schemes providing support for green products, decision of 3 October 2011, OJ C 361, 
10.12.2011, p. 1-5. 
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authorised, under the EUMR, four cases76 involving joint ventures in the solar power sector 
(both thermal and photo-voltaic) and a further four cases77 for the development of wind 
power.  
With the aim of better preserving the environment and available resources, and within the 
broader objective of achieving the shift to a low-carbon economy, the Commission ordered 
both Italy78 and Austria79 not to implement aid earmarked for energy-intensive businesses. 
The Commission also adopted a number of decisions to facilitate the closure of uncompetitive 
coal mines80, some solely concerning aid for exceptional costs (Slovenia81 and Poland82). The 
Commission adopted also other decisions for the closure of uncompetitive coal mines relating 
to aid covering production costs83. In the latter case, a mitigation plan addressing the 
environmental and climate impact had to be provided. 
Waste treatment and recycling also remain important areas of activity, as reflected in the 
number of cases concerned with water and waste management84. A similar trend can be 
observed in the antitrust field, where the Commission is looking into conduct in sectors such 
as waste collection, and the supply of water and waste water services85. 
 Security of supply 
The EU energy sector is characterised by a high dependency on imports, as the EU produces 
only 48% of its energy needs86. Energy dependency differs greatly among Member States; 
Denmark appears to be the only net energy exporter within the EU27, while the Baltic 
countries rely on a single source for their gas imports. The EU energy sector is also 
characterized by a significant need for investments – for instance in electricity generation, 
                                                 
76 COMP/M.6112 Good Energies/NEIF/Newco, decision of 13 April 2011, OJ C 122, 20.4.2011, p.6 , 
COMP/M.6238 RREEF/SMAG/OHL/Arenales, decision of 10 August 2011, OJ C 255, 31.8.2011, p. 1, 
COMP/M.6303 Antin/RREEF/Andasol 1&2, decision of 22 August 2011, OJ C 253, 30.8.2011, p.1, 
COMP/M.6273 Samsung/Korea Development Bank/KNS Solar, decision of 3 August 2011, OJ C 236, 
12.8.2011, p. 6. 
77 COMP/M.6233 FOEW/Dong Energy/Novasion/Aalborg Universitet/Universal Foundation, decision of 27 July 
2011, OJ C 228, 03.08.2011, p. 4, COMP/M.6176 Mitsubishi Corp/Barclays Bank/ Walney Topco 
I&II/SheringhamsShoal Topco, decision of 29 August 2011, OJ C 261, 03.09.2011, p. 1, COMP/M.6155 
GEM/DEME/Electrawinds Offshore/SRIWE/Z-Kracht/Power@sea/Rent a Port Energy, decision of 6 June 
2011, COMP/M.6206 Iberdrola/Caja Rural de Navarra/Renovables de la Ribera, decision of 30 June 2011, 
OJ C 198, 06.07.2011, p. 1. 
78 Cases C38/B/2004 (ex NN58/2004) Preferential electricity tariffs for the benefit of three energy-intensive 
businesses located in Sardinia and C13/2006 (ex N587/2005) and Green Electricity Act, OJ L 309, 
24.11.2011, p.1. 
79 Case C24/2009 (ex N446/2008) State aid for energy-intensive businesses under the Green Electricity Act in 
Austria, OJ L 235, 10.09.2011, p. 42. 
80As provided for by Council Decision No 2010/787/EU of 10 December 2010 on State aid to facilitate the 
closure of uncompetitive coal mines, OJ L 336, 21.12.2010, p. 24. 
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82 Case SA.33013 Coal plan for the period 2011-2015, decision of 23 November 2011. 
83 See German case SA.24642 (N708/2007) Coal mine closure plan 2008-2018, decision of 7 December 2011 
and Romanian case SA.33033 National Hard Coal Company Petroşan, decision of 22 February 2012; IP/12/157. 
84 Cases COMP/M.6088 HIG Capital/Der Grune Punkt-Duales System Deutschland, decision of 7 February 
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2011, OJ C 285, 29.9.2011, p. 1, COMP/M.6253 Talis International Holdings/ Raphael Valves Industries, 
decision of 12 July 2011, OJ C 209, 15.7.2011, p. 16.  
85 For example, proceedings were opened against ARA in Austria and an investigation into conduct by French 
water companies continued throughout 2011.  
86 Market Observatory for Energy, June 2011. 
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where there is a trend for gas and renewables to contribute more to electricity generation in 
the EU. 
The Commission's antitrust enforcement action in the energy sector can contribute to 
resolving security of supply issues by facilitating access to the market and encouraging 
investment.  In 2011, the Commission opened proceedings against ČEZ in relation to possible 
abuses of dominance on the Czech electricity market through the hindrance of  the entry of 
competitors. The Commission also carried out unannounced inspections at the premises of gas 
companies in Central and Eastern Europe, investigating the existence of behaviour that might 
potentially exclude competitors from providing alternative sources of gas, or that might 
involve the exploitation of a dominant position in the supply of gas, for instance by charging 
excessive prices. 
Other tools of competition policy, such as State aid control, can also contribute to the 
completion of the EU internal market for gas. Authorisation of measures aiming at increasing 
security of gas supply in Poland and construction of an interconnection and cross-border 
power line between Poland and Lithuania87 are two good examples. 
2. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Media 
As recognized in the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE)88, Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) play a key enabling role for Europe to achieve its competitiveness 
ambitions for 2020. The ICT industry is directly responsible for 5% of European GDP, with a 
market value of EUR 660 billion annually. It also employs over eight million people 
representing 3.7% of total employment in the EU89. At the same time, ICT contributes far 
more to overall productivity growth, because of the dynamism and innovation inherent to the 
sector, and the enabling role it plays in changing the way other sectors do business. The roll-
out of high speed broadband is a particularly important factor in this regard. 
Latest available figures indicate that the cultural and creative industries encompassing media 
accounted for 4.5% of the EU's GDP in 2008, employing some 3.8% of its workforce90. 
Europe's cultural and creative industries are one of the most dynamic economic sectors 
making a real contribution to the Europe 2020 strategy and some of its flagship initiatives 
such as the Innovation Union, the Digital Agenda, the Agenda for new skills and new jobs or 
an industrial policy for the globalisation era91.Creative content is also an essential input into 
the digital economy and a key driver of consumer demand for digital services. 
The ICT and media sectors are characterised by rapid technological developments. The 
expansion of high-speed networks and the shift from the physical to the digital are having a 
revolutionary impact on ways of doing business. 
                                                 
87 Cases SA.31953 Construction of a LNG Terminal in Swinoujsciu, decision of 5 October 2011, OJ C 361, 
10.12.2011, p. 1-5 and SA.30980 (N 542/2010) Construction of interconnection and cross-border power line 
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Prospective Technological Studies (JRC 65175 EUR 24842 EN). 
90 Building a Digital Economy: The importance of saving jobs in the EU’s creative industries, TERA 
Consultants, March 2010. 
91 Commission Green Paper Unlocking the potential of cultural and creative industries. 27 April 2010, 
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Increasing use of cloud computing is creating the need to connect different products and applications throughout 
the industry. Services offered in this sector will become ever more networked and inter-dependent. The ICT 
sector is also characterized by network and scale effects which tend to enforce the market positions of leading 
players. The Commission considers that ensuring interoperability in order to avoid anti-competitive customer 
lock-in and to preserve the opportunity for innovative firms to compete is critical for competition in the sector92. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and standards are also likely to remain key issues for competition going 
forward. In this context, the competitive impact of the growing strategic use of IPRs, especially patents, is an 
area the Commission intends to focus on. Open standards remain an important way to support interoperability. 
With the rise of cloud computing questions of interoperability, data portability and standards will again be at the 
forefront of the regulatory issues to be tackled. 
The ongoing transition to next generation access networks (NGAs) with much faster access 
speeds has the potential to drive growth and stimulate prosperity. The move from traditional 
copper networks to NGAs should not however be exploited to re-monopolize markets and 
reverse the competitive dynamics achieved as a result of liberalisation of the e-
communications sector. Companies must therefore ensure that co-investment and cooperation 
agreements for the deployment of NGAs respect both sector regulation and competition law. 
The same has to be said as regards the practices of companies in a dominant position, which 
should not result in the anti-competitive foreclosure of competitors. 
Too many barriers still block the free flow of online services and entertainment across national borders. 
Protecting the Single Market remains one of the Commission's top priorities when applying competition law 
within the context of the digital economy. In 2011, the European Court of Justice took a strong stance against the 
artificial partitioning of the Single Market in relation to media content. In its judgment in the Premier 
League/Murphy case93, the Court ruled that the contractual restrictions which deprived consumers from access to 
cross-border broadcasts of Premier League football matches are restrictions of competition by object, contrary to 
Article 101 TFEU. Such absolute territorial protection enjoyed by broadcasters cannot be justified where right 
holders could have obtained appropriate remuneration without prohibiting or limiting cross-border access to their 
content.  
The Commission has continued to use its enforcement tools to ensure unrestricted competition 
and growth in the ICT and media sectors, to the benefit of consumers and to support the  
objectives of the DAE. 
State aid policy is growing in importance for the ICT and media sectors. On 20 June, the 
Commission launched a public consultation on new rules on the State aid assessment of 
support for producing films and audiovisual works94. In May, an issues paper was published 
to initiate a first round of public consultation, where 110 comments were received and 
published in October. The publication of a draft Communication for public consultation is 
foreseen for the first quarter of 2012. 
The Commission is also reviewing the Broadband Guidelines95 in the field of State aid for 
broadband networks. A public consultation was launched in April 2011, and more than 100 
comments received from stakeholders were published in October. A further public 
consultation on new draft guidelines is expected to take place in the first quarter of 2012. 
                                                 
92 Cf. Case COMP/37792 Microsoft (OJ L 32, 6.2.2007, p. 23); see judgment T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission 
[2007] E.C.R. II-3601. 
93 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others v QC Leisure and 
Others Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd., judgment of 4 October 2011. 
94 To review the assessment criteria set out in the Commission communication on certain legal aspects relating to 
cinematographic and other audiovisual works (Cinema Communication) of 26 September 2001, OJ C 43, 
16.2.2002, p. 6. See also the Issues Paper available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_state_aid_films/issues_paper_en.pdf  
95 Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband 
networks, OJ C 235, 30.9.2009, p. 7. 
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 Access to networks and related digital services 
As voiced by the European Parliament in the Schwab report and by other stakeholders, access 
to networks remains a major concern element for achieving a competitive market with 
effective development of the Internet and of the digital economy. In June, the Commission 
imposed a fine exceeding EUR 127.5 million  on the Polish incumbent telecoms operator 
Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (TP) for abusing its dominant position in the period of 2005-
2009. by deliberately seeking to limit competition on broadband markets in Poland by placing 
obstacles in the way of alternative operators, even if there was a change in the approach of TP 
further to the Agreement signed in October 2009 with the NRA. The Commission opened the 
case on its own initiative in 2009 after having observed that Poland had one of the lowest 
broadband penetration rates in Europe, that consumers suffered from lower connection speeds 
and that monthly prices per advertised Mbit/s were much higher than the prices in other 
Member States (and among the highest in the OECD). 
State aid control has an important role to play in accelerating the deployment of broadband 
networks in Europe. Pro-competitive aid measures, which complement private investments in 
areas which are not profitable on commercial terms, are necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the DAE. The volume of State aid approved by the Commission under the State aid 
Broadband Guidelines96 amounted to almost EUR 2 billion in 2011. The Commission 
authorized aid though 18 Commission decisions, covering countries such as France, Poland, 
Greece or Portugal. A similar amount of aid was approved in 2010. 
 An open and fully integrated internal market 
Cross-border market sharing agreements that include non-compete clauses are one of the 
clearest violations of competition law. They put in danger the full integration of the market, 
artificially compartmentalising it along national borders. On these grounds,  in October the 
Commission sent a statement of objections to Telefónica and to Portugal Telecom, regarding 
their agreement not to compete on the Iberian telecommunications markets. 
The development of the internet has a direct effect on the competitive development of related 
services, such as search engines and online advertising platforms. The Commission is 
currently investigating allegations that Google may be abusing a dominant position in online 
search, online search advertising and online search advertising intermediation. It is alleged 
that Google is lowering the ranking of search results of competing services (which specialise 
in providing users with specific online content such as price comparisons, so-called vertical 
search services) and accorded preferential placement to the results of its own vertical search 
services. In addition the Commission is investigating allegations that Google imposes 
exclusivity obligations on advertising partners, preventing them from placing certain types of 
competing ads on their web sites. Finally, the Commission is investigating suspected 
restrictions on the portability of online advertising campaign data to competing online 
advertising platforms97. 
The markets for telecommunications and digital contents are not the only areas where the 
Commission has focused its antitrust actions in 2011. The market for computer mainframe 
maintenance services has also been under scrutiny. In July 2010, the Commission initiated a 
formal investigation against IBM with regard to an alleged abuse of a dominant position by 
                                                 
96 Community Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to rapid deployment of broadband 
networks, OJ C 235, 30.9.2009, p. 7. 
97 Case COMP/39740 Foundem/Google and related cases. 
  25 
foreclosing competing providers of mainframe maintenance services. As a result of the 
investigation, IBM submitted formal commitments to ensure the availability of certain spare 
parts and technical information on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms over five years. 
These commitments were made binding by the Commission in a decision adopted on 13 
December. 
2011 has been a year for further consolidation in the IT hardware sector, where the number of 
global players in the Hard Disk Drives (HDDs) sector has been reduced to three. In May, the 
Commission initiated in-depth investigations into two parallel transactions in this sector, 
namely the acquisition by Seagate of Samsung's HDD business and the acquisition by 
Western Digital of Viviti Technologies - formerly known as Hitachi Global Storage 
Technologies (HGST). On 19 October, the Commission cleared the Seagate/Samsung 
transaction98 and on 23 November, the Commission adopted a conditional clearance decision 
in the Western Digital/HGST case99. The parties to the latter proceedings submitted remedies 
to address competition concerns in several product markets, in particular the 3.5-inch desktop 
market where the proposed merger would have led to a duopoly between the merged entity 
and Seagate. The parties committed to an upfront divestment to a suitable purchaser to be 
approved by the Commission of HGST's 3.5-inch business (as well as some assets of Western 
Digital) in order to ensure the continued presence of a third supplier on these markets. 
 The impact of digitization on content sectors 
The transition from analogue to digital broadcasting using Digital Terrestrial Television 
technologies by 2012 and the resulting digital dividend (i.e. the freed spectrum) should lead to 
new entry and broader viewer choice. EU law100 requires that such dividend be allocated 
subject to specific criteria and procedures (e.g. open, transparent, non-discriminatory, etc.). 
The Commission has intervened against Italy, France and Bulgaria for failing to comply with 
those requirements. As a result of these interventions, Italy organised a beauty contest for new 
digital frequencies (multiplexes), while France and Bulgaria took legislative steps to address 
the breaches. 
As the digital economy develops, so do the markets for digital content products, such as e-
books. In December, the Commission initiated a formal investigation into possible restrictive 
agreements or practices affecting the sale of e-books in the EU. The Commission's 
investigation concerns possible restrictive agreements or practices between five international 
publishers (Hachette, Harper Collins, Simon & Schuster, Penguin and Georg von Holzbrinck) 
and Apple, as well as the character and terms of the agency agreements for the sale of e-
books. 
 Ensuring interoperability 
The ICT sector is characterised by digital convergence and the concomitant growing 
importance of interoperability and standards. In view of network effects that often prevail in 
this sector, interoperability is an important feature for competition to take place in these 
markets. Although personal computers are considered to be the main gateway to the digital 
world, users are increasingly accessing data through other devices such as smart mobile 
                                                 
98 Case COMP/M.6214 Seagate Technology / the HDD business of Samsung Electronics, decision of 19 October 
2011; IP/11/1213. 
99 COMP/M.6203 Western Digital Ireland / Viviti Technologies, decision of 23 November 2011, IP/11/1395,. 
100 Including Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for 
electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 249, 17.9.2002, p. 21-26. 
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phones, which are able to communicate with each other and with computing devices. This 
reinforces the need for interoperability between software products and devices. 
One example of the Commission's approach was the Intel/McAfee case. The Commission was 
concerned that rival IT security products would be excluded from the market given Intel's 
strong presence in computer chips and chipsets. The merger was therefore approved subject to 
commitments from Intel aiming at ensuring interoperability of the merged entity's products 
with those of its competitors101. 
Another example is the clearance of Microsoft's acquisition of Skype102. The Commission 
concluded that it was unlikely that Microsoft would degrade Skype's interoperability, or tie its 
leading Windows operating system with Skype, thereby limiting other players' ability to 
compete with the merged entity. The Commission also concluded that Microsoft would not 
have an incentive to degrade Skype's current level of interoperability as it needs Skype's 
services to remain available on as many platforms as possible, so as to enhance the Skype 
brand. 
Through its review under the EUMR, the Commission ensures that the ICT and media 
markets remain open for new entrants and that access to key elements (whether content, 
technology or interconnection) is not denied. The Commission also aims at ensuring that 
consumers do not suffer from higher prices, less choice, poorer quality and limited innovation 
as a result of mergers in that sector. 
3. Rail transport 
The transport sector is important for EU growth and employment. In 2009103, the value added 
by the transport sector reached EUR 437 billion or 3.7% of EU GDP. Around 11 million 
people were employed in the transport and storage sector, which corresponds to 5.1% of total 
EU employment. However, no less than 13% of household expenditure was devoted to 
transport services. Within transport, the largest subsectors are transport support activities 
(such as the operation of warehouses and terminals) and road freight transport. Rail transport 
represents around 6% of the value added in the transport sector as a whole. It nevertheless 
delivers significant inputs to many other sectors of the economy, while at the same time being 
close to the end consumer. 
In the last 20 years the Commission has been active in supporting the restructuring of the 
European rail transport market and strengthening the position of railways vis-à-vis other 
transport modes. The Commission's efforts have concentrated on three major areas, which are 
crucial for developing a strong and competitive rail transport industry: (1) opening of the rail 
transport market to competition, (2) improving the interoperability and safety of national 
networks, and (3) developing rail transport infrastructure. 
Opening up national freight and passenger markets to cross-border competition is a major step 
towards the creation of an integrated European railway area and of a genuine EU internal 
market for rail. Greater technical harmonization of rail systems and the development of key 
                                                 
101 COMP/M.5984 INTEL / MCAFEE, decision of 26 January 2011, OJ C 98, 30.3.2011, p. 1; IP/11/70. 
102 Case COMP/M.6281, Microsoft / Skype, decision of 7 October 2011, OJ C 341, 22.11.2011, p. 2; IP/11/1164. 
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cross-border rail routes are also helping to break down barriers to a more competitive rail 
sector, along with better connections between EU and neighboring markets. 
Greater competition makes for a more efficient and customer-responsive industry. EU rail legislation has 
consistently encouraged competitiveness and market opening, with the first major law in that direction dating 
back to 1991. The legislation is based on a distinction between infrastructure managers who run the network and 
the railway companies that use it for transporting passengers or goods. Different organizational entities must be 
set up for transport operations on the one hand and infrastructure management on the other. Essential functions 
such as allocation of rail capacity (the “train paths” that companies need to be able to operate trains on the 
network), infrastructure charging and licensing must be separated from the operation of transport services and 
performed in a neutral fashion to give new rail operators fair access to the market. 
 
Rail freight transport has been completely liberalised in the EU since the start of 2007, for both national and 
international services. Therefore any licensed EU railway company with the necessary safety certification can 
apply for capacity and offer national and international freight services by rail throughout the EU. 
 
The market for international rail passenger services has been liberalised in the EU from 1 January 2010. Any 
licensed, certified rail company established in the EU is able to offer such services, and in doing so has the right 
to pick up and set down passengers at any station along the international route.  
 Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system 
In March 2011, the Commission adopted a comprehensive strategy setting out a roadmap 
towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system104. The roadmap contains 40 
concrete initiatives aimed at increasing mobility while reducing carbon emissions in transport 
by 60% by 2050. Some of those initiatives are specifically targeted at increasing competition 
in rail transport. 
As mentioned above, rail freight transport has been completely liberalised since the start of 
2007, while the market for international rail passenger services has been liberalised from 1 
January 2010 on. The Commission initiated court actions against several Member States that 
have improperly implemented EU Directives for the liberalisation of rail freight and 
international passenger transport. The Commission roadmap also foresees the extension of 
market opening to domestic rail passenger traffic. Currently, domestic rail passenger transport 
markets have been opened up to competition in some Member States (including Germany, 
Italy and the UK), but not in others. 
Effective competition in the rail sector is still weak as reflected in the high market shares of 
incumbents and the limited penetration of new entrants. Market entry has so far mainly taken 
the form of acquisitions of market players in one Member State by operators in other Member 
States. However, it remains difficult for new entrants to provide competitive rail services, in 
particular because of the difficulty of gaining fair and non-discriminatory access to the rail 
network and rail-related services. The Commission's proposal on the recasting of the first rail 
package105 aims to address such concerns. Discussions in 2011 in Parliament and Council 
focused on provisions concerning the separation of infrastructure and service facility 
operators from railway undertakings. In addition, the Commission has started to use its 
antitrust policy tools to ensure equal access to the rail infrastructure network. 
Finally, the Commission is seeking to ensure that companies delivering public rail services do 
not receive inappropriate compensation. The Commission regularly verifies that such 
                                                 
104  Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport 
system, European Commission White Paper, COM(2011)144 final, 28.3.2011. 
105  Directive establishing a single European railway area (Recast), European Commission Proposal, 
COM(2010) 475 final, 17.9.2010. 
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companies are not overcompensated for services delivered and so given an unfair advantage 
in the market place. 
 Favouring market entry 
Increasing competition through market entry in the rail freight and passenger transport 
markets has been the main objective of the Commission's activities in relation to merger 
control and antitrust investigations in 2011. 
Because of the Commission's action, there is scope for a new high-speed service in 
competition with the existing monopoly service on the Paris-Milan route, following the 
approval of the joint venture between Veolia Transport and Trenitalia106. An alternative 
service on the Vienna-Salzburg route may also see the light, as the Commission cleared the 
proposed joint venture between SNCF and two Austrian investment firms107. 
In addition, the Commission has started investigations to verify whether vertically integrated 
incumbents (such as Deutsche Bahn108 and Lietuvos gelezinkeliai109) are in a position to 
abuse their monopoly over essential rail infrastructure for the benefit of their own rail 
transport operations and to the detriment of new entrants. 
Since the start of the liberalisation process for freight and passenger rail transport, the 
Commission has examined the incumbents' restructuring plans in several Member States. In 
2011, the Commission opened formal investigation procedures on restructuring aid provided 
to the Greek and Bulgarian railway companies Trainose110 and BDZ111. The Commission 
investigation of Trainose also covers the public service contract concluded with the Greek 
government. The BDZ restructuring plan was notified in May 2011, following the approval of 
rescue aid by the Commission in December 2010112. 
4. The Pharmaceutical and health services sector 
Health care remains an important economic sector, representing about 9% of GDP in the EU, 
with the pharmaceutical sector for prescription and non-prescription medicines accounting for 
close to 2% of EU GDP and the health services113 accounting for 6.5% of EU GDP114. Most 
health costs are borne by the Member States, with patients' direct contributions amounting to 
about 11% of the costs, equivalent to EUR 122 billion annually. The recent economic crisis 
and an ageing population have put Member States under more pressure to scrutinise public 
spending, including the health budget. 
                                                 
106  Case COMP/M.6150 Veolia Transport/Trenitalia/JV, decision of 20 July 2011, OJ C 249, 26.8.2011, 
p.3;IP/11/917. 
107  Case COMP/M.6269 SNCF/HFPS/Wehinger GmbH/Rail Holding, decision of 20 July 2011, OJ C 222, 
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108  See MEMO/11/208, 31.3.2011. 
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111  Case SA.31250, Restructuring aid to BDZ, decision of 9 November 2011; IP/11/1321. 
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113Excluding medicines, government investment on education, health prevention and other therapeutical 
appliances. 
114All figures in this section are Competition DG estimates based on data from the OECD 2008 Health database. 
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Both the pharmaceutical and health services sectors display a number of common 
characteristics: those prescribing the goods or services in question (e.g. physicians) are 
different from the consumers (patients). The same applies to those who pay for the goods or 
services, which are usually sickness insurance funds in the Member States. Prescribers and 
consumers are therefore less price sensitive than in other markets. Furthermore, both sectors 
are fragmented by national regulations regarding authorisation, pricing and reimbursement 
status of the goods or services. In both areas similar competition issues arise, including 
artificial barriers to entry. Keeping prices at a competitive level is of key importance. 
Looking at pharmaceuticals specifically, on average EUR 430 were spent on medicines in 
2007 for each European citizen115, a figure expected to rise in the future, particularly in view 
of Europe's aging populations. The pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated and R&D 
driven. On the supply side, originator companies aim to bring innovative products to the 
market. The patent system provides the legislative framework allowing the companies to reap 
the benefits of their successful R&D activities. Upon loss of exclusivity generic companies 
can enter the market with bio-equivalent versions of the originator products, but at much 
lower prices, thereby contributing to the control of public budgets and giving originator 
companies incentives to continue their R&D for new and innovative proprietary medicines. 
 The competitive importance of generic products and innovative medicines 
The main issues of concern under competition law are practices which, for instance, unduly 
delay or block generic entry or the development and launch of innovative medicines. The 
existence of such practices was analysed in general terms in the sector inquiry and highlighted 
in the final report in 2009116. They include the potential misuse of patent rights and patent 
settlement agreements. The Commission particularly addressed these issues via antitrust 
enforcement action. These enforcement actions complement the Commission's recent work on 
the possible revision of Council Directive 89/10/EEC (also known as the Transparency 
Directive)117, which was also triggered by the results of the sector inquiry, when additional 
reasons for market entry delay of medicines were identified within the regulatory framework. 
The organisation of the health care sector is primarily the responsibility of Member States 
under Article 168 TFEU. However, to the extent that the activities in question involve 
offering goods or services on the market118, the provision of health care goods or services is 
subject to EU competition rules, as emphasised by the 2010 Commission antitrust decision 
sanctioning the French Association of Pharmacists (ONP)119. 
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 Competition-related actions taken to improve the functioning of the market 
Within the pharmaceutical sector, the delay of generic market entry (through agreements and 
contractual arrangements) is the focus of the two cases opened during the year, Cephalon120 
and Fentanyl121. In addition, the Commission is currently conducting a number of 
investigations into cases of generic delay where cases have not yet been formally opened122. 
Further, the Commission continues to monitor the market and obstacles to generic entry with 
particular emphasis on patent settlements. In 2011, it undertook a second monitoring exercise 
which showed a significant decrease in the number of potentially problematic patent 
settlements. In fact the overall number of settlements decreased to 3% in the period of 2010, 
compared to 10% in the period between July 2008 and December 2009 (first monitoring 
exercise) and 22% in the period between January 2000 and June 2008 (sector inquiry)123. At 
the same time, the Commission saw a generalised increase in the use of unproblematic patent 
settlements. The Commission will continue monitoring patent settlements in 2012. 
The Commission also closed an investigation into an alleged misuse of the patent system (i.e. 
alleged application for unmeritous patents) as regards innovative medicines in the Boehringer 
case. This case was closed, as the undertakings concerned had reached an agreement, which 
also addressed the Commission's competition concerns124. In the agreement, Boehringer 
removed its blocking positions, thereby lifting the obstacles for its competitor, Almirall, to 
launch its innovative medicine. 
The Commission continues to monitor activities in the health care markets. The decision 
against the French ONP of December 2010, sanctioning ONP for its attempts to fix minimum 
prices in the French clinical laboratory testing services market as well as for restricting the 
development of groups of laboratories in the market, was appealed before the General Court 
in February 2011. Further, the French Parliament adopted a new statute on 13 July 2011 that 
would have led, inter alia, to limiting the creation of groups of clinical laboratories in the 
French market, thus going against the purpose of the Commission's Decision. The problematic 
sections of the statute were, however, subsequently declared invalid by the French 
Constitutional Council, on procedural grounds125. 
 III. COMPETITION DIALOGUE WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
 Structured dialogue with the European Parliament 
While the Commission has full competence for the enforcement of the EU competition rules, 
subject to the control of the European courts, the Commissioner for Competition and his 
services hold a continuous dialogue on competition issues with the European Parliament. The 
Commission appreciates Parliament's timely contribution to debates on competition policy 
and regularly informs it about competition policy initiatives. 
                                                 
120 Case COMP/39686 Cephalon; IP/11/511,opening of proceedings on 19.04.2011.  
121 Case COMP/39685 Fentanyl; IP/11/1228. opening of proceedings on 18.10.2011.    
122  MEMO/10/647 of 3 December 2010;  MEMO/09/435 of 6 October 2009.   
123 For further information on patent settlement monitoring see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html  
124 Case COMP/39246 Boehringer, closure of proceedings of 6 July 2011; IP/11/842. 
125 Conseil Constitutionnel − Décision n° 2011−640 DC du 04 août 2011. 
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In addition to the presence of Commissioner for Competition at meetings and hearings of the 
ECON committee, the Competition DG keeps Parliament informed about upcoming and 
announced public consultations, gives briefing sessions to MEPs and staff on a range of 
current issues, and holds numerous bilateral meetings and discussions on specific topics. 
The Commissioner for Competition visited the ECON committee for a structured dialogue 
three times in 2011; in March to present the Commission Work Programme for 2011 in July 
to present the Annual Report on Competition Policy; and in November to present the 
Commission Work Programme for 2012. He also attended a hearing on collective redress and 
a meeting with the competition working group. 
The Commissioner for Competition chose to launch the Commission's public consultation on 
SGEIs in a speech to ECON, underlining the importance he attaches to Parliament's 
involvement in that dossier, and specifically asking for Parliament's input. 
 Follow-up to Parliament's Resolution on the 2009 Report on Competition Policy 
Parliament adopted its Resolution on the 2009 report on competition policy on 20 January 
2011. In a letter to the ECON Chair on 15 March 2011, the Commissioner for Competition 
responded to key points made in the Resolution. Parliament was particularly interested in the 
Commission's activities linked to the financial and economic crisis, and asked the 
Commission to carry out an evaluation of the temporary State aid measures introduced during 
the crisis. 
In response, the Competition DG prepared a Staff Working Document on the temporary State 
aid rules during the financial and economic crisis126 which the Commissioner for Competition 
sent to the Chair of ECON on 28 September 2011. The Working Document was more 
extensive than the Parliament's study on the same topic, although both reached similar 
conclusions: the aid granted to the financial sector had been justified and helped stabilise the 
financial markets and maintain credit flows to the real economy. One important aspect of the 
Commission's action, which was not mentioned in the Parliament report, was the restructuring 
conditions resulting from the Commission's decisions for all the major beneficiaries of State 
aid. That restructuring minimised the distortions of competition that the aid could have 
created, and ensured burden-sharing among stakeholders. 
In its Resolution, Parliament recalled its 2007 and 2009 Resolutions calling for the 
Commission to propose legislation to facilitate individual and collective claims for effective 
compensation for damages resulting from breaches of antitrust law. In response to 
Parliament's call in the 2009 Resolution for a coherent approach across sectors, the 
Commission launched a public consultation on collective redress in March 2011. The 2012 
Commission Work Programme lists a proposal on antitrust damages actions, which the 
Commissioner for Competition hopes to present to the College in 2012. 
In addition to the official response by the Commission to Parliament's Resolution, in March 
the Competition DG also sent the ECON committee a detailed response to all of the points 
made in the Eppink report127. Competition DG officials also met members of the ECON 
                                                 
126 SEC(2011)1126 final (5.10.2011):  Commission Staff Working Paper on the effects of temporary State aid 
rules adopted in the context of the financial and economic crisis economic crisis. 
127 Texts adopted: P7_TA(2011)0023, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010-0374&language=EN  
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committee who had expressed an interest in specific areas, for example tax competition, 
fining policy, financial services and the investigations into the CDS market. 
 Taking Parliament's views into account 
Competition DG engagement with Parliament's ECON committee 
The Competition DG organised two seminars for ECON assistants and political advisers of 
the members of the ECON committee in 2011. The first, in February, covered the main 
themes in the 2011 Competition Work Programme (SGEIs; the Rescue and Restructuring 
Guidelines; the Commission's public consultation on Collective Redress) and on fines, given 
Parliament's interest in this subject. The seminar gave staff the opportunity to ask detailed 
questions to Competition DG desk officer experts. 
A second seminar was organised to coincide with the presentation by the Commissioner for 
Competition of the 2010 Annual Competition Report, in July 2011. A follow-up briefing for 
members of the ECON competition working group was offered for September by the 
Competition DG. 
The Director-General of the Competition DG spoke at an Open Coordinators meeting of the 
ECON committee in May. Senior Competition DG officials also had a number of bilateral 
meetings with MEPs from ECON and other committees in 2011, on a range of subjects. 
Information on Competition DG activities 
All information on current and previous public consultations and Impact Assessments are 
published on the Competition DG's website128. The Competition DG also sends information 
on the launch of public consultations to the secretariat of the ECON committee. All timely 
contributions to those consultations by the European Parliament are welcomed, and 
Competition DG staff can brief MEPs on aspects of particular interest. 
All responses to public consultations are published on the internet, as well as any background 
studies commissioned, together with the Commission's Impact Assessment, and any related 
Staff Working Papers. It is not common practice to summarise the results of public 
consultations. 
Services of General Economic Interest 
The Commissioner for Competition and Competition DG officials participated in meetings of 
the Public Services Intergroup on SGEI in the months before the launch of the March 2011 
public consultation. The Commissioner for Competition presented the Commission's initial 
thinking to ECON on 22 March, and reported back to the committee in July and again in 
November, at which time he stated that he would be able to take into account a number of the 
concerns raised by Parliament in its Resolution on the SIMON report.  
Other subjects of interest to Parliament 
Fines 
                                                 
128 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html  
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Members of the ECON committee have expressed a range of concerns about the 
Commission's fining policy. The services have explained the fining methodology in seminars, 
and in a detailed reply to an MEP letter, and was pleased to participate in a short seminar on 
fines in November 2011. The Competition DG also published a factsheet on fines, which 
seeks to explain the reasons for fines and how they are calculated. 
Compliance is another theme raised by Parliament. The Schwab report on the 2010 
Commission's Report on Competition mentioned the importance of encouraging compliance, 
as well as ensuring effective deterrence. The Competition DG published a brochure on 
compliance for companies in November 2011, which directly addresses both points129. It 
helps companies to develop a proactive compliance strategy, summarises the key competition 
rules companies should respect and generally sets out basic methods to help companies ensure 
compliance with EU competition rules, particularly small and medium-sized companies.  . 
The brochure also confirms the Commission's position that implementing a compliance 
programme does not have any negative implications for companies, nor will it be recognised 
as a mitigating factor when calculating the level of fines. 
The Commission published its revised Best Practices package in October 2011. As well as 
strengthening the role of the Hearing Officer, and clarifying the role of economic evidence, 
that package outlined measures to improve the experience of parties to an antitrust 
investigation. In particular, statements of objection, which set out the Commission's 
arguments at an early stage in the case, and to which parties can respond in detail, will include 
an indication of the parameters of any future fine.  
Cases and investigative work 
MEPs often ask the Commission questions about individual ongoing competition cases, to 
which the Commission is unable to reply due to the confidentiality requirement of the 
investigative procedures. However, Competition DG staff regularly meet MEPs at their 
request, to explain the procedural steps in an investigation, and to have a general discussion 
on a particular sector, as far as is possible. 
The Commission has a range of tools at its disposal for the enforcement of EU competition 
rules. They include investigations in individual cases, sector inquiries, and working with other 
Directorates-General on regulatory measures. The Parliament has repeatedly called for sector 
inquiries in a number of areas, which the Commission has noted. However, sector inquiries 
are very resource-intensive, and sometimes the same objectives can be achieved as effectively 
through other types of investigation. 
 Competition DG contact with Parliament in other policy areas 
A number of committees follow issues relating to competition policy. Competition DG 
officials at all levels have held a series of bilateral meetings with MEPs from other 
Parliamentary committees, including IMCO, ITRE (where the mid-term review on R&D&I 
was presented), TRAN, LIBE, JURI, and BUDG. Two files were of particular interest to the 
Competition DG in 2011. 
Regulation 1049 – Access to documents 
                                                 
129 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/compliance/index_en.html    
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The report of the committee on Civil Liberties (LIBE) on access to documents proposes to 
delete the Commission's proposed exemption for documents in the area of competition 
enforcement (investigations). The Competition DG is concerned that unrestricted access to 
documents could be damaging to its enforcement activity, particularly in the context of the 
protection of its leniency programme. The Commission will continue to follow that matter 
closely through Council and during trilogue discussions. 
 Competition DG engagement with the European Economic and Social 
Committee 
The Commission also keeps the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) informed 
about major policy initiatives, and participates in study group and section meetings.Moreover, 
on 4 October the Commissioner for Competition attended the Section for the Single Market, 
Production and Consumption, where he presented the Staff Working Document on the 
temporary State aid rules during the financial and economic crisis. On 7 December, the EESC 
adopted an opinion on the Report on Competition Policy 2010130. 
 IV. ANNEXES 
(1) List of Competition DG initiatives adopted under CWP 2011 
(2) List of Banking cases (State aid) 
                                                 
130 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 'Report from the Commission – Report on 
Competition Policy 2010', 7 December 2011, OJ C 43, 15.2.2012, p. 25 – 29. Available at 
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.int-opinions.19680  
INT/594 – CESE 1850/2011. 
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ANNEX 1: List of Competition DG initiatives adopted under CWP 2011 
• Communication on the Reform of State Aid Rules on Services of General Economic 
Interest – COM(2011) 146 final 
• Report on Competition Policy  2010 – COM(2011) 328 final* 
• State aid Scoreboard: Spring 2011 update – COM(2011) 356 final* 
• Best practices in Antitrust proceedings*: 
– Commission notice on best practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (2011/C 308/06) 
– Decision of the President of the European Commission of 13 October 2011 on 
the function and terms of reference of the hearing officer in certain competition 
proceedings (2011/695/EU) 
– Best practices for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in 
cases concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in merger 
cases (Staff Working Paper) 
• State aid Scoreboard: Autumn 2011 update – COM(2011) 848 final* 
• Communication on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis – C(2011) 8744 final 
• Review of the Framework on State aid to shipbuilding – (2011/C 364/06) 
• SGEI package: 
– Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the application of Article 
106(2) TFEU to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to 
certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest - C(2011) 9380 
– Communication from the Commission on the application of the European 
Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of 
general economic interest - (2012/C 8/02) 
– Communication on the European Union framework for State aid in the form of 
public service compensation (2011) – (2012/C 8/03) 
* relates to other measures not included in the CWP 2011 
ANNEX 2: List of State aid banking cases 
State aid cases - situation – 31/12/2011 
Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2011 
AUSTRIA 
Type of measure / Beneficiary 
 
Type of Decision Date of adoption 
SA.32745 – Restructuring of Kommunalkredit Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/389 
31 March 2011 
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SA.32172 and SA.32554 – Temporary approval of 
aid for Hypo Group Alpe Adria 
[decision replaced – see below] 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/636 
24 May 2011 
SA.32172 and SA.32554 – Replacement decision: 
Temporary approval of aid for Hypo Group Alpe 
Adria 
Decision not to raise objections 19 July 2011 
SA.31883 – Restructuring of Österreichische 
Volksbanken AG 
Decision to open an in-depth 
procedure 
IP/11/1522 
9 December 2011 
SA.31189 – BAWAG Amendment Decision Decision not to raise objections 
- 






SA.29833 – Monitoring of KBC: Amendment of 
certain measures in the Restructuring Plan 
 27 July 2011 
SA.30962 – Monitoring of Ethias  12 September 2011 
SA.33751 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
Dexia Bank Belgium 
IP/11/1203 17 October 2011 
SA.29833 – Monitoring of KBC: extension of the 
target date of certain divestments by KBC and 
amendment of restructuring commitments 




SA.33760, SA.33763, SA.33764 – Temporary 
approval of guarantees on the refinancing of Dexia 








SA.31867 – Amendments to liquidation aid for 
Roskilde bank 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME 11 / 24.05 
24 May 2011 
SA.33001 – Prolongation EXME/11/28.06 28 June 2011 
SA.33001 – Amendment of winding-up scheme for 
credit institutions in Denmark 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/11/01.08 
1 August 2011 
SA. 33757 – Extension of the winding-up scheme for 
credit institutions in Denmark 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1523 
9 December 2011 
SA.32634 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
Amagerbanken 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/676 
6 June 2011 
SA.31945 – Liquidation aid for Eik Banken Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/677 
6 June 2011 
SA.33117 – Aid for the liquidation of Fionia Bank - 
revised commitments 
- 18 July 2011 
SA.33639 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
Max Bank 




MC 15/2009 – Landesbank Baden Württemberg 
"LBBW" – Deka divestment 
- 14 January 2011 
SA.31646 – Monitoring of Sparkasse Köln-Bonn - 
Prolongation of the deadline for certain divestments 
- 30 March 2011 
SA.28264 (C15/2009) – Restructuring aid for Hypo Final decision 18 July 2011 
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Real Estate IP/11/898 
SA.29338 (C29/2009) – Restructuring of HSH 
Nordbank 
Final conditional decision 
IP/11/1047 
20 September 2011 




20 December 2011 
SA.33571 – Temporary approval of the 
recapitalisation of NordLB 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/11/22.12 




SA.32767 – Amendment  EXME 11/04.04 4 April 2011 
SA.33153 – Prolongation EXME 11/27.06 27 June 2011 
SA.33154 – Prolongation  EXME 11/27.06 27 June 2011 
SA.31154 – Restructuring of Agricultural Bank of 
Greece (ATE) 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/626 
23 May 2011 
SA.34064 – Temporary approval of second rescue 
recapitalisation of National Bank of Greece under the 
Greek recapitalisation scheme 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/11/22.12 




SA.32995 – Prolongation EXME/11/23.06 23 June 2011 
SA.32993 – Prolongation  EXME 11/09.06 9 June 2011 




SA.33006 – Prolongation (including guarantees on 
short-term liabilities) 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/673 
1 June 2011 
SA.33740 – Prolongation (including guarantees on 
short-term liabilities) 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/11/08.12 
8 December 2011 
SA.29907 and SA.32504 - Resolution of Anglo Irish 
Banks and Irish Nationwide Building Society 
Final Decision 
IP/11/801 
29 June 2011 
SA.33216 – Second rescue recapitalisation of Bank 
of Ireland 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/854 
11 July 2011 
SA.33144 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
merged entity Allied Irish Banks/Educational 
Building Society 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/892 
15 July 2011 
SA.33311 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
Irish Life & Permanent Group Holdings 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/913 
20 July 2011 
SA.33023 – Restructuring of Quinn Insurance 
Limited 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1187 
12 October 2011 
SA.33443 – Second Restructuring Plan of Bank of 
Ireland 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1572 
20 December 2011 
SA.33170 – Resolution scheme for credit unions in 
Ireland 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1574 




SA.34032 – Reintroduction of the Italian Guarantee 
scheme 




SA.30704 – Temporary approval of support to 
Latvian Mortgage and Land Bank and opening of in-
Opening decision 
IP/12/77 
26 January 2011 
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SA.32188 – Extension EXME/11/21.1 21 January 2011 




SA.26674 – Restructuring of ABN Amro Group Final conditional decision 
IP/11/406 
5 April 2011 
SA.33303 – Additional commitments by SNS Reaal to 
ensure proper remuneration of a capital injection 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/11/19.12 




SA.33008 and 32946 – Prolongation EXME/11/28.6 28 June 2011 




SA.32158 – Third prolongation EXME/11/21.1 21 January 2011 
SA.33178 – Fourth prolongation EXME/11/30.06 30 June 2011 
SA.34034 – Amendment EXME/11/21.12 21 December 2011 
SA.32157 – Third extension EXME/11/21.1 21 January 2011 
SA.33177 – Fourth prolongation EXME/11/30.06 30 June 2011 
SA.26909 – Banco Português de Negócios – opening 
of in-depth procedure 
Opening decision 
IP/11/1235 




SA.32261 – Temporary approval of rescue 
recapitalisation of Nova Ljubljanska Banka 




SA.32990 – Prolongation IP/11/673 1 June 2011 
SA.33402 – Capital injection for Caja de Ahorros de 
Mediterraneo (CAM) 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME 11/25.07 
24 July 2011 
SA.33096 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
NCG Banco 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1143 
30 September 2011 
SA.33095 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
Unnim Banc 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1143 
30 September 2011 
SA.33103 – Temporary approval of rescue aid for 
Catalunya Banc 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1143 
30 September 2011 
SA.33917 (2011/N) – Temporary approval of the 
recapitalisation and liquidity support for Banco de 
Valencia 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/11/1388 
21 November 2011 
 
